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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EDITH M. LANGLOIS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant1 
vs. 
NORMAN T. REES, 
Defendant and Respondent .. 
Case Nor 
9054 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant 
STATEMF.NT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff and appellant \vill be referred to as plaintiff 
or in her own name, and the def en dan t and respondent v..~ i1 t 
be referred to as defendant or in his own name. 
All italics are ours. 
The plaintiff, Edith M. Langlois, brought this action 
against Nor man T. Rees for injuries she sustained when struck 
by an automobile driven by the defendant. The accident oc ~ 
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curred on the .25th day of JYlarch, 1958, at. about 4~ ~0 p.ru.+ 
Mrs. ianglois was walking east across an unmarked crosswalk 
from the west side of State Street to the east, on the south side 
of the intersection of t'irst Avenue. 
In her com plaint, the plaintiff complained the de£ en~ant 
v.ra.s negligent in (a) failure to yield the right-of-way) (b) 
traveling too fast for existing con.ditions, (c) failure to have 
his automobile under control) and (d) failure to keep a. proper 
lookout. 
The defendant ans";;~lered~ denying negligence and claimed 
that the in j u r ie5 v.,T cr e contributed to hy the negligence of the 
plaintiff. 
The issu~s created by the pleadings and the pretrial order 
as am ended were as follows: The plaintiff claimed defendant 
was negligent in (a) f~l~re t~. yield right·of-way, (b) travel-
ing too fast for existing conditions, (~) failure to keep his 
car under con tro I so as to a void striking pia in tiff~ (d) fall ure 
to keep a proper 1 oo kou t~ (e) f ai I ure to keep his windshield 
properly clear so he could see what was on the highway to be 
seen, and (f) plain tiff is en ti tlcd to recover on the last clear 
chanc: e doctrine.· De£ endant ~ s contentions were that plaintiff 
(a) failed to yield the right-of-way to defendant and (b) 
failed to keep a proper lookout) and cited Section 41-6· 7 9, 
subsections (a) and (c)~ V~C.A. 1953~ and defenda.pt denied 
he was negligent 
The case came on for tria 1 before a jury on the 3 rd and 
4th days of March~ 1959+ Exhibit 1, a map of the intersection 
dra ~Tn by an engineer) was admitted in evidence~ and Exhibits 
2, 3l 4, and 5 ~ a 11 pictures of the intersection l were admitted·+ 
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The court refused to give the following instructions re-
quested by p 1 a in tiff: 
No. 1, plain tiff's request that the court ho 1 d defendant ne gil w 
gent as a matter of law, and direct a verdict for the plaintifL 
No.2 
The mere fact tb at the plain tiff was not in the 
marked crosswalk at the time she v.ras struck by de-
fendant"s automobile will not relieve the defendant 
from liability unless she v.; as gu i1 ty of other contrib u-
tory negligence that proximately resulted in her in-
JUries. 
And the following two instructions from J.lFC: 
It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to yield. 
the right~of~way to a pedestrian crossing the road~vay 
within any tnarked crosswalk) or within any cross-
walk even if it is not marked at the end of any block. 
failure to so yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian 
in any such crossv..T alk "V~t~"ould cons ti tu te negligence. 
JIFU 20.6. 
As to locality on a roadway such as that involved 
in this case, these factors enter in to consideration of 
the question of ~,..hat conduct is required of a pedestrian 
in the exercise of or dina.ry care in crossing a high 'va y. 
L If he crosses within a marked crossvlalk, or at an 
intersection within a crosswalk, whether marked or 
not, the law requires the driver o£ all vehicles to yield 
the right-of r vra y to him. 
2+ If he crosses at any other place, the Jaw requires 
him to yield the right~of~way to all vehides on the 
roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard~ 
although this requirement does not relieve the driver 
of a vehicle from the duty to exercise ordinary care 
for the safety. of any pedestrian upon a roadway. 
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3. The atnount of caution :required to constitute 
ordinary care increases as does the danger that a rea-
sonably prudent person, in like positionJ would a_ppre~ 
l1cnd 1n the situation. For example, he--d.vy vehicular 
traffic, fast traffic, poo.r visibility, obstructions to view,. 
~ret pavement-any of these or any other perceivable 
factor increasing the ha:.card, increases the amount of 
caution vlhich an ordinary prudent person would use. 
JIFlJ 20.8. 
No.5 
It is not enough that a driver be able to stop within 
the range of his vision or that he use diligence to. stop 
after discerning an object. The rule makes no allowance 
for delay in action. He must, on peril of legal negli· 
gence, so drive that he can actually discover an object~ 
perform the n€cessary acts necessary to stopping~ and 
bring the car to a complete ha It within such range if 
necessary to avoid. collision with and injury to others 
on the high way. If his vision is obscured by snow~ 
sleet or fog on the windshield or windows so that he 
·cannot see the required distance ahead, . or to the side 
as the case rna y be~ he must) within such distance from 
tb e point of such lack of vision, bring his car to such 
control that he can stop imtnediately~ and if he cannot 
then sec, .shou1d 5top.-72 A~L.R. 1352. 
! r he fall ov.rin g are instructions of the court pertinent to 
plain tiff1 s claims in this case : 
No.4 
It was the duty of defendant Norman T+ Rees to 
use reasonable care under the circumstances of this 
case in driving his automobile to avoid danger to him-
self and others and to observe and be aware of the 
condition of the high Via y, traffic thereon and other 
existing conditions and particularly with respect to 
the particulars of .negligence charged by the plaintiff, 
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he 'vas obliged to observe due care in all respects as 
to the following: 
(a) Not to travel too fast for existing conditionsr 
(b) To keep his car un de.r reasona b 1 e, sa£ e and 
proper contra 1. 
(c) To keep a lookout for conditions reasonably to 
be anticipated ahead of him. 
(d) To keep his windshield reasonably cJear so that 
he could see what was on the highway to be seenT 
With respect to the allegation that defendant failed 
to yield the right~of-\vay~ the court instructs you that 
that allegation is not applicable because of an instruc~ 
tion tn that regard which ~rill be given to you. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that defendant was negligent in one or more of the 
foregoing four partkulars ( right-of.,vay being exclud-
ed) and that such neg J igencc V/ as the proximate cause of 
the accident and of plaintiff's injuries then unless you 
find a] so that plain tiff is bnr red from recovering from 
defendant because of her contributory negligence~ upon 
which sub j crt you will also be instructed) your verdict 
shall be for the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
No~ 6 
At the time of this accident, one of the la\vs of Utah read 
as follows: 
·'Be tween adjacent in tcrsect ions at w h 1 ch traffic con-
trol signals are in operation; pedestrians shall not cross 
at any place except in a marked cross\valk.~' 
l ; nder this la v.l, plain tiff \\'Tas prohibited from cross~ 
ing State Street at any point other than the marked 
crossw aJ k on the north side of the intersection of State 
Street and F r r st Avenue, and since it is admitted that 
she dicl not attempt to use the marked cross~~alk at 
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that point, the court rules that she violated the above 
law and that such a violation constituted negligence . 
.... 
No.7 
Utah Ia w requires that a pedestrian crossing th~ 
street at a point other than v.,r ithin a marked crossw~lk 
or 'vi thin an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection~ 
must yield the right-of-,vay to all automobiles apw 
proachin g so near as to constitute an im mediate hazard~ 
The parties have stipulated and agreed that at the 
point v,.r here plaintiff \~·as. crossing~ there was no marked 
crosswalk. Thj s court instructs you that the place where 
plaintiff ·was attempting to cross State Street was not 
'·an unrnar ked eros swalk at an intersection,'' as those 
terms are used in Utah law, and therefore plaintiff 
was required to y ie 1 d the right-of-way to defendant, s 
approaching automobile. Therefore, if you find that 
defendant's automobile was so near as to constitute 
an inuned1ate hazard and that the plaintiff did not 
yield the right-of.way, she was negligent~ 
No.8 
Regardless of the court· s instruction tba t plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence in crossing where she did 
and regard i es s of v.,T h ether you shall determine that 
she ~:as negligent in failing to yield the right~of-way 
to defendant, if you do so determine, the court instructs 
you that be£ ore either or both of such acts of ne gli-
gence wiJl bar pi ain tiH from recovering her damages 
f ron1 clef end ant you must .first find that either one or 
both of such acts of negligence was a proximate~ con-
~r i ~ u tory cause of the accident and of plaintiff's in~ 
JUnes+ 
If you find this issue against defendant and for the 
plaintiff and if you also shall have found against the 
defendant and for the plaintiff with respect to the 
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allegations of defendant's negligence then you may 
assess plain tiffs damages under the instructions to 
be given you ih that regard r 
If you find the issue of con tr ibu tory negligence 
against the plaintiff and for the defendant you will 
yet be required to determine and fin d. v.,· h ether plain~ 
tifFs contributory negligence is excused by reason of 
the rules of v.r hat is known in the law as the Last CJ ear 
Chance Rule. 
Ins ttuctio n ~ {). 9 was the instruction as to the la.s t c 1 ear 
chance. We are not including No. 1, 2, 3, and 5, nor the stock 
instructions. 
The case \vas submitted to the jury and they returned a 
verdict of no ca usc of action. Thereafter :1 th c plain tlff made a 
motion for new trial which \Vas by the court denied on April 6~ 
1959~ and thereafter, within the time required by law, the 
plaintiff fi 1 ed her appeal to the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
First Avenue intersects with North State Street but does 
not cross State Street. First Avenue from curb to curb is fifty~ 
eight feet, six inches. ~-ide. The north and south traffic on State 
Street is divided by double lines, and there are two lanes for 
the northbound traffic and two lanes for the southbound traffic. 
There is a marked pedestrian crossing on the north side of the 
intersection crossing State Street, and there .is a sign on the 
northeast corner of State Street~ facing north and south, mar ked 
-=~pedestrian lane.t' The sidewalk on the south side of First 
A venue is twelve feet \Vide and there is not a marked cr055.lng 
at that point to the west side of State Street. There wa.s no 
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sign or barrier on either side .indicating that a p~rson should 
not cross at that point (see ex hi bits) 7 There is a s t~p sign on 
First Avenue on the northeast corner of the 1nte rs ection for 
traffic going ~Test on First A venue (see Exhibit 1, .a map of 
the area~ and Exhibits 2J 3~ 4, and 5, pictures of the area) I 
There are traffic con tro I signals at South Temple and State 
Street and at North 'Temple and State Street. 
The accident occurred while the plaintiff was crossing 
State Street in the unmarked crosswalk on the south side of 
the intersection of First Avenue and State Street. 
The plain tiff in this case is a 'v ido~T. She was eighty wfour 
years of age at the time of the accident. Sn e 1 ived at the Gate-
~va y Apartments at 28 North State Street and had lived there 
for eleven years (R. 57). 
The plaintiff knew there Vv·as a crosswalk on the north 
side of the street and knevl that it had painted lines and knew 
that it was by the stores (R~ 68). She knew that people used 
the south cross\valk~ Almost every body used it, and this had . 
been going on for the eleven years she had lived there (R. 56~ 
59, 60j and 69) + 
On the day of the accident, March 25 ~ 195 8, the phllntiff 
went to the L.D.S. Temple early in the morning~ The weather 
~Tas n icc ~Then sh c went but it \Vas raining and snowing when 
she started home about 4: 00 p.m. She v.,ralked up through the 
general offices of the Mutual and through the little alley 
onto the west sidewalk of State Street.. She turned south and 
walked just beyond the post which is a little north of the 
north boundary of the unmarked south eros sing across State 
Street (R. 58-61) I 
10 
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She looked up and down to see if there were any cars~ and 
there weren't any. There was no car coming down First Avenue 
that had entered the intersection and so she decided to cross~ 
She started to go across and she was knocked down and knocked 
unconscous ( R. 59) . She was. walking straight east to\vard 
the sidewalk (R .61). 
Norman T. Rees, the defendant~ lived at 402 .First Avenue 
and was twenty -five years old a.nd single. He had driven a car 
since he was eighteen years old and had a Utah driver's license! 
restricted to wearing glasses when he drove (R. 30). 
On March 25, 1958, the day of the accident, he had a 
two-door green Chatnpion 1950 Studebaker that had been 
driven 70 ~ 000 to 80,000 miles~ He drove vlest on First A venue 
in order to get to 35 Ric:ha.rds Street where he vlorked. He 
tes ti.fi. ed that visibility was poor and the snow was plastering 
on the \Vindshield, a wet~ heavy snow (R. 34). His right front 
window and left front wiodol-Y were fogged. He could only 
see through the sweep of the windshield wiper on the \V ind. 
shield (R. 38). He could see straight ahead ... but he had diffic:ul ty 
seeing to the left or right. As he went down First Avenue 
approaching State Street~ he v.tas in the lane next to the center~ 
He knew about the stop sign on State Street and First Avenue 
{R~ 35). 
He stopped at the stop sign~ according to his testimony l 
and after looking to the north and south and there was no 
traffic, made his turn. He said he made a normal left hand 
turn (R. 36) r Defendant Rees didn't know exactly v..~hat part 
of the street Mrs. Langlois, the plaintiff~ was in. By that, he 
meant ho~ far south she was. He said she was three or four 
11 
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feet from the curb when he first saw her and that she was 
walking .ln an easterly direction (R. 36-37). He said Mrs. 
Langlois ~Tas v.ralking about medium speed. 
On the map he made a mark that would be about forty 
feet from where he claimed was the point of impact. There 
he made the turn. Hov.rever, he said he didn't see her until 
he ~vas about ten or t\\·elve feet from her. As he was going 
around the turn onto State StreetJ he v.'as unable to see Mrs. 
Langlois ( R. 4 7) ~ He first saw her about three 01 four feet 
east of the 'vest curb and she was hit fowteen feet west of the 
east curb. He .figured he was going ten or fifteen miles pet 
hour as he star ted to make the turn. The de£ endant admitted 
that in his deposition he said he struck her about even with 
the south sidewalk of First Avenue. 1~he defendant was very 
familiar with the intersection and he had seen people go across 
the unmarked cross\val.k. However, he said they were ja ywafk.. 
ing (R. 51)+ 
He testified that ~1rs. L~glois had a pie<:e of newspaper 
over her head to protect herself from the snow and that from 
the tim c he first saw her when she was three· or four feet 
from the curb~ he· never took his eyes off her and that she 
didn't turn her head~ change her pace~ or stop (Rr 52). He 
¥/as doing everything he could to stop his car (R. 48 and 53)~ 
and when he stopped she \Vas lying down with her head to the 
south and her feet to the north. 
He picked up the new spa per and put it in his car. How-
ever, he didn't discuss that with the officer or show ic to him 
(R. 55)+ 
11 
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He did not recall looking across the street before he 
made his move from the stop sign and he didn't recall seeing 
the plaintiff before she left the sidewalk and he didn~t believe 
that he honked his horn (R. 56-57). 
Officer Proctor Lesco e \Vas a police officer and he had been 
for two years. On that date he was assigned to accident inves-
tigation (R. 15). He arrived at the intersection at 4:39 p.m. 
and when he arrived he saw the defendant's automobile and 
Mrs. Langlois and the police ambulance. ·He testified that it 
was snowing a wet snow. He measured where Mrs. Langlois 
was~ and she \Vas tVvvelve feet south of the south edge of the 
extended side'-'ra 1 k and the ca [ 'vas eleven feet ( R~ 15 and 16) . 
He talked to tbc defendant in the police car and the 
clef en dan t told him his estimate of his speed as he made his 1 eft 
turn was fifteen miles per hour~ and that he first observed the 
pedestrian thirty lo far!J feel awaJ, and that the impact speed 
at the time of the collision was five to ten miles per hour. His 
general statement to Mr. Lescoe was: 
~~I v.ras stopped at the stop sign on First Avenue and 
State. I looked both ways; no cars were coming so I 
made a left turn. Didn't see her until I was almost on 
top of her. There v..-·as some frost on my right front 
window~" (R+17) + 
According to the map~ Ivlr. Lescoe said that 1\lrs. Langlois 
was about fourteen feet east of the "V-.!T est curb of State Street. 
0 n cross examination by defendant's counsel, Mr. Lescoe stated 
that he didn~t find aO¥thing at the scene o£ the accident indi-
cating that defendant~ s estimate o £ his speed was not pro per. 
Mr. Lescoe said that if the defendant sav..T the plaintiff three 
13 
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or four feet away and was going .fifteen miles per hour, he 
couldn't have reduced his speed to five or ten miles per hour 
in three or four feet. He said that at fifteen miles per hour it 
would take twenty-five to thirty feet to stop, and at five miles 
per hour it v,rould take 5even feet or probably ten feet on wet 
pavement (~~ 19-24) . 
Mr. Lescoe said tb at according to his measurements that 
day she \vas about twelve feet west of the east curb Jine, but 
according to Exhibit 1 (the engineer's drawing) it would be 
fourteen feet west (R. 19). 
Mrs. Langlois was taken by the ambulance over to the 
Clinic and ·or+ Crockett waul dn' t let her in. He said she would 
have to go to the hospital. She passed out and didn't remember: 
anything until she was ln bed in the L. D .Sr Hospital~ where 
5he :stayed for about three days. They took X -rays and put on 
a cast. 
She used crutches for a few days and then a cane. She was 
bruised all over (R. 60~6 2) . She was sore and her ankle pained 
some and she had to stay in bed a good deal of the time for a 
few days. Her daughter stayed with her for several weeks. She 
kept the cast on during that time and used a cane for about 
three months+ 
She ~"ent to England io Augustl 1958~ and in England 
she seemed to get along pretty well (R~ 63~64) + 
She didn t t recall having a newspaper over her head. 
Dr. ThoJnas E. Bauman, an orthopedic surgeon with the 
Salt Lake C llnic ~ testified that he sa \v Mrs. Langlois at the 
L.D.S. Hospital on March 25~ 1958, and he examined her. 
14 
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She had a fracture of the latetal malleolus and she was treated 
w 1th a plaster cast and bed rest for dizziness. She had a short 
leg cast put on and V~t'Ore it until May, 1958~ when it \vas taken 
off and her recovery was very satisfactory (R. 30-33). 
THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The pla.i~tiff makes the follov./ing assigrunents of error: 
1. The verdict of the jury vtas contrary to the great ~eight 
Df the evidence and vtas unsupported by the evidence. 
2. The Court erred in not directing the jury to return a 
verdict in favor of the plain tiff and a gain st the defe-ndant. 
3. The Court erred in d:enying plaintiff's motion for ne\v 
trial. 
4. The Court erred in refusing to give the jury plain tiff's 
requested Instruction No. 2 and Jifl~ 20.6 and 20.8. 
5. The Court erred in its failure and refusal to give plain-
tiffs requcs ted Ins tructi~n No. 5. 
6. The Court erred in its f a.il ure to inc I ud e in I n.s truction 
No. 4 that the defendant failed to yield the right-of-~Tay to 
plaintiff. 
7. The Court erred in giving Instruction Ko. 6. 
8. The Court erred ln giving Instruction ·~o. 7. 
The plaintiff relies upon each of the assignments of error 
set forth above and will consider the ass i gnm en ts in the f o j J o v.r-
ing argwnent consisting of tVJt·o different points. Assignment 
of error 1:\o. 3, of cour.sej is included in each of the tv.ro argu-
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ments as there \\'as sufficient error to justify the granting of a 
new trial under each point. 
POINT l. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY~ 
IN INSTRUCl~IONS NO. 6 AND 7, THAT THE PLAIN. 
TIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW~ AND 
ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRuCTION NO+ 2) AND INCLUDING JIFU 20~6 AND 
20.8+ 
Assignments of Error 4, 6~ 7~ and 8. 
The Court based, these instructions upon Section 41~6-79j 
Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
~~pedestrians shall yi eJ d I igh t -of-way r-
( a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than w !thin a marked crosswalk or within 
an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield 
the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadwa. y. 
(c) Betv.l een adjacent intersections at which traffic 
control signals are in operation pedestrians shaH not 
cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.'' 
'fh e question i mnl edia tel y arises: Does the intersection 
of First Avenue and State Street constitution an intersection ? To 
decide this question, we will first look to our own statute 
which defines nintersection .. and !tcrosswalk.'~ 
L' 41·6-8. Intersection ----crosswalk.-· 
(a) ~"Intersection. n ( 1) The area embraced within 
the pro 1 on ga tion or connection of the lateral curb 1 ines 1 
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or. if none~ then the lateral boundary lines of the road-
ways of ~o highways which join one another at, or 
approximately at, right angles, or the area within which 
vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at 
any other angle in conflict. 
(b) HCrosswalk:· That part of a roadway at an in~ 
tersection included within the connections of the lateral 
lines of the sidevla l ks on opposite sides of the highway 
measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs, 
from the edges of the traversable roadway; any portion 
of a roa d\\o· a y at an intersection or elsewhere distinct! y 
indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other mark-
ings on the surf a.ce~ · t 
l~nder tbat definition there can be no doubt that it is an 
intersection~ The fact that First Avenue stops at State Street 
and does not cross beyond State Street v.rould not change the 
~ituation. 5 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 288, p~ 662: 
t~The \veight of authority is to the effect that an 
~intersection' \vithin the meaning of traffic statutes or 
regulations a rj ses from the meeting of one street with 
another at an angle, although one of the streets stops 
at and does not cross the other~ 0 th er cases require 
the streets to cross in order that they shall be con-
sidered intersecting streets .. ~ 31 A.L.R. 488 (anna-
. tation) ~ Junction of two streets may form a highway 
intersection with a traffic statute or regulation, although 
one of tbem extends only to and not beyond the other 
is supported by the weight of authority. n 78 A~L.R. 
1198-su pplemental to 31 A.L.R~ 488, holds the same. 
It is admitted that at the tin1 e of th c accident there 'vas 
a traffic control signal working at North TeinpJe and State 
Street and also at South Temple and State Street. If North 
Temple and State Street and South Temple and State Street~ 
17 
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vl here there are traffic control 1 ig h ts, arc ad j accn t intersections, 
then perhaps the lo,vcr Court ~·ould have been right. 
The v,ro~d t~ adjacent'' is relative in meaning~ and its con- · 
struction is determined by the context in which it is used in 
a statute. Grudnosky v. Bislow, 88 N.W. 2nd 847 (Minn. 
19·/13). 
State ex rel. Dry man v. District Court of Ninth Judicial 
District, Supretne Court of A-fontana, 1954, 276 P (2d) 969. 
This Court cited "¥vith approval the definition of ·~adjaccnf' 
froJn 1 C.J-S., pp~ 1464-1465: 
~~The vl/ord 'nd j ac:ent' is of Latin derivation from 
· ad-jaceo', to ] ie at, or near. It has been said that the 
\VOCU has no arbitrary meaning or definition~ but that 
t h c tc.rm is a relative and not a de£nite and absol u tc 
on c ~ and the exact meaning of ..,.,. hich) in any pa rticnl a r 
ca sc] is determinable p rinci pall y by the con text in which 
it is used~ the facts and circumstances of the case~ the 
subject rna tter to \V h 1 ch it is applied, or the intent of 
th c Lc gi s l a ture or the parties~ and the word is usually 
to be given a broad substantial construction and not 
limited to the literal tne aning as defined by lexica g · 
graphcrs." ·. 
t 
1 Adjacent'' is defined in Pcti ti oner s of School l)i strict 
l\1o. 9, Caddo County, v. Jones] "District Judge, et al., Okla-
homa, 1949, 140 P(2J) 922. Therein the definition of the 
term, as contained in Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, is 
<-1 u ote d with a. p p rov al as follows : 
''.Adjacent does not al\vay.s imply actual contact~ but 
it doc-S not admit of anything of the same kind between; 
th u.s, adjacent 1 ots are in contact~ but adjacent houses 
Jna }' or may not be." 
18 
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This definition was approved by Gty of Ada v. Whitaker et al., 
212 P(2d) 482 (Okla. 1949). 
The only sensible way to define 4 ~ adjacent'' in the Utah 
statute) supra, would be the same as in the two 0 klahoma 
cases. Thus~ adjacent inters cctions ~~ou ld not admit of another 
intersection between them. 
The argument might be advanced that if this construction 
is a do pted, great inconvenience 'vnu 1 d be encoun tercd by the 
motorists being ob 1 iged to reco gnizc un1nar ked c ros sw alks 
such as the one in this case. But, on the other hand~ if the Court 
should hold adj a.c ent meant .. ~near, r, untold confusion and 
hardships to the pedestrian ~Tould be the result ... 'Nearn is a 
generic term and there are streets in this city 1" in fact all over 
the state~ where the traffic signals are all the way from three 
blocks to a mile apart and the road is intersected by many 
streets, none having marked cross~: a} ks. The pedestrian ~~ould 
have to walk blocks in order to cross the road. Under the 
sensible construction of the \Vord ~·adjacent/~ as set out by 
the Oklahoma courts~ it would be a co1nparativel y simple m attc r 
for the City to pJace signs at the crosswalks of the intersections 
they did not wish the pedestrian to cross. See Sections 41 ~G· 2 0 ~ 
41-6·21~ and 41-6-22, U~C.A. 1953. 
It is safe to asswne that the law 'vas originally written 
to cover instances like Main Street be tv; cen First and Second 
SouthJ Second South and Third South, etc. 
The south sidewalk on First A venue extends 1 evel to State 
Street~ an actual invitation for pedestrians to cross there. The 
conditions are exactly simi 1 ar to those on the north side~ except 
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as to the sign and the painted lines. There is no sign there 
d i r ccting ped cs tri ans not to cross+ 1~he place v/ here plaintiff 
crossed \vas an un1narked crosswalk as defined by Section 
41~6-8, supra. 
'fhc Court, in Instruction No. 6 ~ 1 n s tructed the jury that 
the plajnt1ff v/as negligent as a matter of la'v for ~·alking 
\vherc she did. In Instruction No. 7, the. Court said she 'va.s 
obLiged to yield the right -of-way to defendant's approaching 
automobile_ In vie~T of those two instructions, it was impossible 
for the plaintiff to recover. The first paragrapJ1 of Instruction 
No. B does not help. 
"Regardless of the courfs instruction that pJajntlff 
was guilty of negligence in cro:s sing where she did and 
regardless of v.rhether you shall determine that she 
\vas negligent in failing to yleld the right-of-way to 
defendant~ if you do so determine~ the court instructs 
you.that before either or both of such acts of negligence 
will bar pI aint.ltf from recovering her damages from 
defendant you must first .find that either one or both of 
such act5 of negligence was a proximate, rontributory 
cause of the accident and of plaintiff's injuries.~' 
1~he fir~t thing the jury would say .ls that if she hadn't 
been in the position which the Court said "''as negligent and 
unlawful~ the accident never \VOuld have happened. 
The Court's error in giving Instructions No. (-) and 7, and 
fa i 1 ing to give plain tiff· s requested instructions as set forth in 
the s ta tern en t of the case constituted p rej ud tcial error. 
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POINT II. 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS CONTRARY TO 
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING THE JURY TO 
RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
If the plaintiffs contention is correct in Point I, then she 
was crossing State Street in an unmarked cross~ralk~ as defined 
by subdivision (b), Section 41~6-8~ U.C.A~ 1953. In that 
event. the plaintiff had the right~of-way over the defendant 
who was making his left turn south on State Street. 
Subdivision (a), Section 41-6-78, U+C.A. 1953: 
-t
4Pedestrians' right-of-way. - (a) When traffic~ 
control signals are not in place or not in operation 
the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-wayj 
slowing do'Arn or stopping if need be to so yield, to 
a pedes t t ian cto ssin g the road v,· a y within a c rossw a.lk 
when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway 
upon which the vehicle is traveling) or -~vhen the pedes-
trian is approaching so closely from the opposite half 
of the road \\'~a y as to be in danger, but no pedestrian 
shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety 
and wa.lk or run into the path of a vehicle which is 
so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield. 
This provision shall not apply under the conditions 
stated in 41-6-78(b) ," 
Coombs v. Perry~ 2 Utah 389, 275 P(2d) 680 
Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P (2d) 495 
Smith v. Bennett~ 1 Utah 2nd 224, 265 P (2d) 401 
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1~he -~vriters are 1nindfui of the pedestrian's obligations. 
The pedestrian t s right-of~ v.,r a y is not absolute. The pedestrian 
has a right -of~ \\1 a y, but not a right to self-inflicted rna yh em for 
TW7 hich the de fen dan t can· be held liabLe. l\.fingus v. 0 lsson, 
supra. 
Where a pedestrian failed to look} or having looked, 
failed to see what he should have seen and paid heed to, the 
cases ho 1 d is negligence~ but by the saln e to ken, the motorist 
bas s orne d u.ties too 7 As V!las so aptly said in Jur isch v. Puget 
Tranportation (~(L, Supreme Court of Washington~ 1927, 258 
Pac. 39: 
~1£ the conceded right of way means anything at 
all) it puts the necessity of continuous o bs erva tion and 
avoidance of injury upon the driver of the automobil~ 
w·hen approaching a crossing~ just as the necessity o£ 
the case puts the same higher degree of care upon the 
pedestrian at other places than at crossings.'' 
Cro.ss ings are there es pecia ll y for pedestrians, and motorisn 
in approaching them must bear this in mind. The driver of 
an automobile should al \va ys be aware of the fact that pedes-
trians rna y be eros sing a street at intersections and that pedes-
trians so crossing the street are entitled to the right-of--way. 
'I o conclusively show that the de£ en dant was guilty of 
negligence in this case and that the plaintiff was free from 
contributory ncg1igcnce~ let us look at the record. The plain~ 
tiff, eighty-four years of age at tba t time, stopped on the west 
curb of State St rce t) imm edia tel y facing the cross w a.lk on the 
south side of the intersection of State Street and First Avenue. 
She looked up and down to see if there v..' ere any cars. There 
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weren't any. There was no car coming down First Avenue 
that had c n te red the intersection and so she decided to cross. 
The plaintiff had a. right to presume that a motorist who might 
come down First Avenue v.rould stop at the stop sign, and 
before making his left hand turn, exercise due care to ascertain 
that such movement could be made with reasonable safety. 
She 1;va lk ed a. few steps straight east toward the south si d e\valk 
of First Avenue and \vas struck. That is all she remembered. 
It is undisputed that there was a he a VJ ~ ~· et snowstorm 
at the time. The defendant was driving west on First Avenue, 
and in tended turning south on State Street. His v isi bi li ty ~T as 
poor and the snow was pla5tering on the windshield (R. 3·1). 
His right £ron t \Vindow and his left front window' were fogged. 
He could only see through the sweep of the windshield wiper 
(R. 38). He could see straight ahead, but couldn~t see to the 
left or right. He stopped at the stop sign~ a ceo rding to his 
testimonyj and after looking to the north and south, as he said, 
and there \\'as no traffic~ made a normalle£ t hand turn ( R. 36) . 
If he wa5 facing west~ he would have had great cliff iculty seeing 
any appreciable distance to the north or to the south. He could 
only see pr ac tic ally straight in front of him. 
The de£ en dan t first to 1 d off ice r Lescoe that he saw 11 r s. 
Langlois thirty or forty feet fro 1n t h c point of impact. Then at 
the trial he said that he sa "\V her ten or hvcl v e f cct. In his 
general statement to officer Lescoe:r he said he didn't see her 
un ti 1 he was practical I y on top of her. However, at the trial J 
he was very sure that he first sa~' her three to four feet east 
of the west curb. There is no qucs tion that Mrs. Langlois ~'as 
struck fourteen feet east of the west curb. 
2 ~ 
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This eighty-fourwyear~old woman walked from ten to 
eleven feet from the point defendant first saw her to the point 
where she was struck. According to one part of defendanfs 
testimony~ that he saw her ten or eleven feet away, then his 
car had to be going the same speed as the plaintiff. If such 
~·ere the case, he could ha vc stopped. Obviously, his sta tern ent 
in that regard is wrong~ If the defendant, as is claimed, was 
Via tching Mrs. Langlois \V alking across the street with a paper 
over her head from three feet from the west curb to the point 
v.r here sh c vilas s true k fourteen £ eet east of the curb, it would 
clearly appear that he had two choices to make. First, he could 
have cut over to the v.,r est side of State Street and missed her. 
Second, he could have stopped. Had the defendant, as he once 
told the officer, seen the plaintiff thirty or forty feet away, he 
could have stopped his car unless he was speeding. In either 
event~ he 1;vould have been negligent 
The third alternative is that the defendant, either on 
a ceo unt of inattention on his part or on account of the snow 
on the v./ indshi el d and the fog on the windows, failed to see 
the plaintiff. He proceeded to make the left hand turn and 
~·as~ as he said in another part of his testimony~ rlgh t on top 
of her before he sa\v her. At any rate~ he knocked or pushed 
Jvlrs. Langlois a distance of eleven or twelve feet south~ where 
she v.ras picked up. 
Any one of the above alternatives demonstrates the de. 
fendant's negligence beyond a peradventure of a doubt. The 
h
defendknant didthn'tt sh~un~ .any warnibng, yedt hedknew or sh~uhld ,j 
ave OVv'n a ts vlston was o scure an someone m1g t 
be on tbe cros.swalk. T'he law is correctly stated in plaintiffs 
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requested Instruction No. 5~ taken from 72 A.L.R. 1352. A mo-
torist shou I d be able to stop within the range of his vision. 
~~If his vision is obscured by sno\V ~ sleet or fog on 
the windshield or windows so that he cannot see the 
required distance ahead, or to the side as the case rna y 
be, he must, within such distance from the point of 
such 1 ack of vis ion~ bring his car to such con tro 1 that 
he can stop immediatelyt and if he cannot then seeJ 
should stop.~' 
The cases on automobile and pedestrian are legion and 
many case5 have gone so £ ar as to indicate that a pedestrian 
should anticipate almost anything that a careless motorist 
migh~ do. Such is not the law here nor should it be. Was Mrs~ 
Langlois., the plaintiff here, required to anticipate that someone 
coming west on First Avenue .and State Street~ v,rith his vision 
obscured by snow and fog on windshield and windovls, ~Tau 1 d 
carelessly and negligently run into her? 
· Mrs. Langlois was not contributorily negligent. A recent 
Personal Injury Newsletter reviewed) as they said, 1: l two beau ti-
fully written opinions' r from Michigan in which the Court 
held PEDESTRIAN IS NOT A ~~LEGAL SITTING DUCK.t' 
The Court said; 
1:~The test of contributory negligence is not \1lhether 
the plain tiff did all that he concei v a b 1 y could have 
done or even all that, in retrospect, it is obvious he 
should have done. Plaintiff did fail to make a proper 
estimate of defendanfs proximity through the v.~indoVitTS 
of the double-par ked car. PI a in tiff did £aiL to an tic i p a tc 
defendant's swerve into the other side of the street. 
Plaintiff did fail to make a correct decision on the 
direction from which his greatest danger might come. 
But~ asked the court~ ~Can we -=.really say that these 
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failures of judgment ~rete such as to ~e u~deba.t.ably 
outside tb e realm of conduct of the orduiartl y w prudent 
person? ~ .. As the power and acceleration of the 
au tomo b ll e have increased, the effectiveness of the 
evasive action of the pedestrian has declined ... · . This 
Court shou I d not leave the pedestrian a legal sitting 
duck.' " Ware v. Nelson~ 88 NW 2nd 524 (Mich. 
1958) + 
The dec1sion 1n the Ware case was rendered on March 5 ~ 19 58. 
A day earlier, the 1\1ich1gan court held in Bartlett v. Melzo, 
88 NW 2nd 518 (Mich. 1958): 
"At COJnmon lav.ll unaided by statute or o~dlnance~ 
th c rights of pedestrians and motorists at crossings 
~~ere said to be equal. It was the duty of each to exer w 
cis e d u.e care. nut a dis tinction is drawn in the I a w of 
negligence between standard and amount of care (em-
phasis by the court) ~ A motorist must exercise a greater .. ; 
amount of care than a. pedestrian+ The motorist has 
under his contro 1 an in:s truru en tali ty capable of inflict~ .I 
ing great bodily harm upon relatively slight impact .· ~:! 
and at .slight risk to himself. This aspect of the la ·w of ·.· ·' 
negligence has not received the emphasis demanded 
by its si gni£ cance in the motorist-pedestrian cases. This 
is one reason \vhy the common Jaw rule of reciprocal 
rights .and duties has not sufficed to protect pedestrians 
from the hazards of ever· increasing automobile traffic. 
Legislative bodies have sought other solutions and have 
·given the pedestrian the right of way at street cross-
ings~ The san1c ordinance is involved in this case as 
was involved in Moldenhauer v ~ Smith~ 311 Mich. 
265j 18 N\V 2nd 818 ( 1945). In that caseJ despite the 
r 1 gh t of \1\-• a y given the pedestrian by the ordinance1 
he 'vas held to be contributorily negligent as a matter 
of la \\~. The Mold cnh.a uer case erroneously interpreted:::_·;~:· 
the ordinance and is overruled. The ordinance entitles · 
the pedestrian to positive preferential treatment at 
26 
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eros swal ks. The care required of the motorist goes 
beyond the common law rule of ordinary care. 'We 
do not sit to rende.r nugatory the efforts of our people 
to protect their lives and limbs. The ordinance places 
upon the motorist certain aH irmative duties; He must 
approach a cros·swalk at such moderate speed as to 
be able to yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing 
therein~ and be able to bring his car to a. complete stop, 
if nee essary, to accord the pedestrian his right of \V a y. ~ 
nThe tenor of the decision in the Bartlett case is 
probably best expressed by these wo_rds of the court: 
'We look with horror upon ancient rites involving 
h urn an sacrifice. We take prid~ in our progression fr0111 
the sacrifice of the 6rst~born son~ to the lamb, then to 
the abolition of sacrifice en tir ely) yet historians of the 
future may well note that it v.ras a common sight in 
our cities in this era to observe the citizens of the com-
m unity running for their lives~ literally, if ca. ugh t in 
the center of the street by a changing traffic light. 
Those not so nimble as others perish in greater num-
bers. The decedent v.rhose case is before us was 76 
years of age~ Whether he was able to run or not the 
record does not disclose. When asked if the decedent 
began to run when the traffic started moving, as he 
was leaving the center of the road, a witness replied 
that 4 ~the first couple of steps he ·~val ked. t ~ The next 
question: ""Did he run after that ?n A. \'He speeded it 
up.'' r Concludes the court, ,Not~ certainly, enough.~ t~ 
¥rs~ Langlois had a right to cross 'vhere she did. It was 
not incumbent upon her to use the north marked inter section. 
If it could be said that she should have gone there~ then it 
could be said that s.he should have walked either to North 
Temple or to South Temple where signal lights made it even 
safer to cross. The p 1 a inti ff was not con tributor i 1 y negligent 
and the Court erred in failing to direct a verdict in her favor. 
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Even in. the event the lower Court was right and the 
p 1 a in tiff Ut' as not in a mar ked crosswaJ k as d efi.ned by Section 
41 -6-8, she still would have been en titled to recover. Pedestrians 
rus torn a.r il y crossed State Street V-.JT here this acdden t ocrur ted. 
The defendant \vas familiar ~'tth that intersection and he had 
seen people cross at that point. He knew pedestrians crossed 
there and knew that they m1 ght be using that area at any time. 
Therefore~ having that know ledge, he had the duty to drive at 
that point ~· ith the same care and caution as if it were an actual 
tna r ked pedestrian lane. 
Morgan v. Domino; La. App. 166 S. 208 (1936): 
~ .. Considering defendant's know ledge that the: place 
in question ~T as c"u stomar il y used by pedestrians as a 
crossing, the principle of law governing motorists and 
pedestrians at pub lie crossings or street intersections 
.in the absence of statutes or ordinances is applicable. 
This pr inci p J e is that motorist and the pedestrian have 
equality of right in the use of the crossing, and each 
must exercise such right with reasonable regard for 
the safety and convenience of others.':> 
MilJer v. Tiedemannj 94 A. 835, 249 Pa. 234 (191_5): 
~'"It is true Mr. Miller was not crossing street ar 
the end of a block, s ti 11 he \vas doing so at a paint which 
de£ end ant~ s ch au[ cur kn ev.r was customarily and very 
generally used for that purpose. B 
The Court erred in not instructing the jury that the platn-
ttH had the right-of v.:ay. In fact, w1der the circumstances, the 
Court should have instructed the jury to bring in a verdict in 
favor of the p 1 a in tiff and against the clef en dan t. 
All the a.ssignment:s of error complained of were preju-
dicial.-
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CONCLUSION 
This case is another illusttation of the hazard of driving 
an automobile during a heavy wet snowstorm. Here~ the only 
\:jsibility the defendant h.ad was through the S'~Neep of the 
windshield wiper. His side win dow s, according to defendant's 
own testimony~ were fogged. If the windows were fogged the 
probability is that the windshield was also fogged. When a 
pedestrian comes into view from either side in circumstances 
such as this., he often appears to come suddenly. Instead of 
excusing a driver~ it only adds to the degree of care required. 
Instructions No. 6 and 7 given by the Court were clearly 
erroneous. North Temple and South Temple are not adjacent 
intersections any more than Salt Lake City and Sacramento .are 
adjacent state capitals; Car son City intervenes~ The pI aintiff 
had the right-of-way~ The plaintiff did everything required 
of a pedestrian in crossing the s tr~et. She did not have the 
agility of a university athlete to jump out of the way and even 
a uni ver si ty athlete) in this case~ ~-ou l d have been beset with 
d.ifficul ties had he tried to escape the on coming car. The de~ 
fe.ndant was driving too fast for existing conditions, especially 
in view of poor visibility and a heaYy, wet snowstorm. 
Where£ ore, your appellant prays that this Court reverse 
the trial Court and enter j u dgm en t for the plain tiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY S. McCARTY and 
C. VERNON LANGLOIS 
29 
AtlorneJS for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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